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Theses
•	 Very	few	reports	on	military	incidents	and	attacks	in	the	North	
Caucasus	 have	 been	 published	 in	 Russian	 and	 global	media	
over	the	past	few	months.	Compared	to	preceding	years,	when	
accounts	on	clashes	and	numerous	victims	in	the	region	were	
on	the	news	almost	every	day,	a	situation	like	this	has	not	been	
seen	in	the	two-decades-long	history	of	the	modern	Caucasian	
wars	 (the	First	Chechen	War	broke	out	 twenty	years	ago,	 in	
December	 1994,	and	the	North	Caucasus	started	making	 the	
headlines	in	newspapers	worldwide).	
•	 The	intensity	and	frequency	of	the	conflict	in	the	Russian	Cau-
casus	is	clearly	decreasing.	Its	nature	has	changed,	as	well.	As	
a	rule,	the	active	side	is	constituted	by	law	enforcement	agen-
cies	carrying	out	raids	on	the	mujahideen,	who	are	unable	to	
organise	themselves	into	any	large-scale	military	activity.	The	
death	count,	which	is	falling	every	year,	is	further	proof	that	
this	conflict	is	becoming	less	intense.	The	situation	in	Chech-
nya,	which	was	the	main	source	of	instability	in	the	region	for	
years,	 is	 especially	 symptomatic.	At	present,	 it	 is	 one	of	 the	
most	peaceful	republics	in	the	North	Caucasus.
•	 The	 main	 reasons	 for	 the	 partial	 stabilisation	 of	 the	 situa-
tion	in	the	region	include	ideological	changes	in	the	militants’	
camp	and	the	related	organisational	crisis	observed	in	the	Is-
lamic	military	underground	known	as	the	‘Caucasus	Emirate’.	
Since	the	idea	of	Chechen	nationalism	and	separatism	was	re-
placed	with	 jihad,	 the	military	struggle	 in	 the	Caucasus	has	
been	diluted	ideologically	in	global	jihad,	has	lost	its	unique-
ness	and	has	been	marginalised	since	top	priority	is	now	re-
served	for	the	Syrian	and	Iraqi	fronts.	The	direct	effects	of	this	
transformation	include	a	redirection	of	Caucasian	recruits	to	
the	Middle	East	and	a	mass	influx	of	former	and	active	mili-
tants	 to	 Syria,	 where	 hundreds-strong	 Caucasian	 (mainly	
Chechen)	 military	 groups	 have	 been	 formed.	 Furthermore,	
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the	militants’	aggressive	Salafi	ideology	has	made	them	alien-
ated	from	the	residents	of	the	Caucasus,	for	whom	ethnic	iden-
tity	 and	Sufism,	which	Salafis	 believe	 to	 be	heresy,	 are	 still	
important1.	Other	reasons	for	the	organisational	crisis	within	
the	Caucasus	Emirate	include	the	lack	of	experienced	leaders,	
the	low	level	of	esteem	for	the	new	emir,	Aliaskhab	Kebekov,	
and	the	devastating	consequences	of	the	long-lasting	military	
conflict.	
•	 The	stabilisation	is	also	to	a	great	extent	a	result	of	Moscow’s	
Chechenisation	policy,	as	part	of	which	Akhmad	Kadyrov	and	
later	his	son,	Ramzan,	were	given	internal	 independence	and	
guarantees	 of	 high	 subsidies	 in	 exchange	 for	 stabilising	 the	
situation	 using	 any	 means	 possible.	 The	 successful	 compila-
tion	of	political	moves	(winning	over	militants),	bloody	terror,	
genuine	economic	reconstruction	of	the	republic	and	building	
on	Chechen	nationalism	and	Sufism	as	the	ideological	base	op-
posed	to	Islamic	fundamentalism	(Wahhabism)	have	led	to	the	
degradation	of	Chechen	guerrilla	forces	and	stabilisation	of	the	
situation	in	Chechnya.	The	‘carrot	and	stick’	tactic	employed	by	
Moscow	with	regard	to	 the	Caucasian	republics	has	also	pro-
duced	 some	 repercussions.	 The	 short-term	 effects	 are	 a	 con-
sequence	 of	 the	 unprecedented	 repression	 used	 prior	 to	 the	
Sochi	Olympics,	while	the	long-term	effects	have	been	achieved	
through	 adopting	 a	 milder	 policy	 with	 regard	 to	 peaceable	
Salafis,	mainly	in	Dagestan	and	Ingushetia	in	2011-2013.	
•	 The	calmer	situation	recently	observed	in	the	Caucasus	is	to	
a	great	extent	an	illusion,	being	a	result	of	the	tendency	to	view	
security	in	the	Caucasus	through	the	prism	of	the	activity	of	
the	armed	Islamic	underground	and	at	the	same	time	to	dis-
regard	other	destabilising	factors	(ethnic	conflicts,	clan	rival-
ries,	etc.).	Furthermore,	 the	partial	 stabilisation	 is	unstable,	
1	 The	notions	of	Salafism	and	Sufism	are	explained	in	the	frame	‘Salafism	and	
Sufism	in	the	North	Caucasus’.
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a	contingent	outcome	of	the	situation	rather	the	result	of	sys-
temic	change.	The	situation	has	stabilised	because	short-term	
favourable	(from	the	Russian	point	of	view)	factors	have	come	
into	existence	(for	example,	unprecedented	special	operations	
were	held	before	the	Sochi	Olympics),	while	the	region’s	press-
ing	problems	remain	unresolved;	and	these	problems	generate	
chronic	instability	and	cause	the	Caucasus	to	drift	away	from	
Russia	in	civilisational	terms	with	increasing	speed.	
•	 An	economic	or	political	crisis	in	the	Russian	Federation	may	
result	 in	unfreezing	the	conflicts	 in	 the	Caucasus,	 including	
a	reactivation	of	the	idea	of	Chechen	independence,	the	foun-
dations	for	which	are	being	laid	now	by	Kadyrov	(this	is	the	
price	 the	Kremlin	 is	paying	 for	peace	 in	Chechnya),	and	 the	
idea	of	the	Caucasus	Emirate,	which	is	a	part	of	global	jihad.	
In	the	short	term,	a	reduction	of	subsidies	to	the	Caucasian	re-
publics	from	the	federal	budget	could	give	rise	to	conflicts;	and	
this	 reduction	 is	 possible,	 given	 the	 deteriorating	 economic	
situation	in	the	Russian	Federation	and	the	significant	costs	of	
the	process	of	integration	of	Crimea	following	its	annexation	
by	Russia.	Furthermore,	the	stability	in	Chechnya	is	ephem-
eral	because	it	is	not	based	on	social	consensus	but	on	Ramzan	
Kadyrov’s	 dictatorial	 rule	 and	 the	 unwritten	 agreement	 be-
tween	him	and	President	Vladimir	Putin.	
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I. No News feed or geNuINe sTabIlIsaTIoN?
The	Caucasus	has	‘calmed	down’	over	recent	months	–	news	from	
the	region	is	no	longer	hitting	the	headlines2.	One	important	rea-
son	why	news	from	the	Caucasus	is	given	less	attention	in	the	me-
dia	is	the	fact	that	the	Russian	information	space	has	been	domi-
nated	by	the	recent	developments	 in	Ukraine.	On	the	one	hand,	
this	 is	done	 in	response	 to	market	demand	 (genuine	 interest	 in	
what	is	happening	in	Ukraine)	and,	on	the	other	hand,	this	is	part	
of	Russian	propaganda,	which	is	now	focused	on	Ukraine.	The	im-
age	of	the	enemy,	which	is	constantly	present	in	the	Russian	me-
dia,	has	also	been	transformed.	The	enemy	is	no	longer	the	‘Cau-
casian	 terrorist’	 or	 the	 ‘immigrant	depriving	Russians	of	work’	
–	now	the	enemy	is	the	‘Banderite’	and	the	‘American	imperialist’	
who	supports	him.	
Western	 journalists’	disinterest	 in	 the	North	Caucasus	can	also	
partly	be	viewed	as	a	‘Sochi	effect’.	Before	the	Olympics,	the	me-
dia	were	speculating	about	the	threat	the	proximity	of	the	war-
ridden	 Caucasian	 republics	 posed	 to	 the	Olympics,	 and	 numer-
ous	foreign	journalists	visited	Dagestan,	Kabardino-Balkaria	and	
other	regions.	Since	the	Olympics	were	not	disturbed	by	any	inci-
dent,	interest	in	the	Caucasus	has	naturally	waned.
Security	 in	the	region	is	evaluated	through	the	prism	of	the	ac-
tivities	 of	 the	 Islamic	military	 underground	 (and	 previously	 of	
Chechen	separatism):	if	the	rebels	are	not	active,	it	means	that	the	
situation	is	stable.	This	picture	is	false	to	a	great	extent,	since	it	
fails	to	take	into	account	the	significantly	less	spectacular	mani-
festations	of	 instability	(ethnic	conflicts,	conflicts	over	 land,	re-
lentless	rivalry	between	the	clans,	conflicts	inside	Islam,	organ-
ised	crime,	abuse	of	authority	by	the	 law	enforcement	agencies,	
2	 Non-Russian	 media	 have	 no	 independent	 sources	 of	 information	 in	 the	
North	Caucasus.	They	use	Russian	media	reports.	Internet	portals	of	Cauca-
sian	Islamic	militants	are	an	exception.	But	they	do	not	adhere	to	any	jour-
nalistic	standards,	and	most	of	the	information	they	publish	is	propaganda.
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etc.),	 which	 are	 nonetheless	 important	 destabilising	 factors3.	
Furthermore,	 the	 Caucasus	 is	 unstable	 because	 its	 economy	 is	
not	functioning.	This	region	is	less	an	integral	part	of	the	Russian	
Federation	but	 is	more	 like	a	Russian	colony,	where	the	relative	
peace	and	order	results	 from	subsidies	 from	the	 federal	budget,	
military	strength	and	the	rule	of	local	clans	backed	by	the	Krem-
lin,	whose	authority	is	based	on	nepotism	and	corruption.	
However,	the	impression	of	partial	stabilisation	in	the	Caucasus	is	
not	merely	a	product	of	the	aforementioned	factors.	Jihad	is	gen-
uinely	dying	down	in	the	Caucasus,	proofs	of	which	include	not	
only	the	official	Russian	statistics	but	also	information	provided	
by	militants	themselves,	who,	for	example,	openly	admit	that	they	
are	short	of	recruits,	money	and	public	support.	Military	actions	
initiated	by	the	rebels	are	less	and	less	frequent.	Their	nature	is	
also	changing.	Whereas	 several	years	ago	 the	guerrillas	plotted	
spectacular	military	actions	(for	example,	the	offensive	on	Naz-
ran	in	2004	or	Nalchik	in	2005)	and	terrorist	attacks,	at	present	
they	are	only	able	to	operate	on	a	much	smaller	scale	(individual	
killings	of	representatives	of	law	enforcement	agencies	and	lower-
ranking	state	officials,	leaders	of	Sufi	fraternities	and	official	cler-
gymen,	attacks	on	shops	selling	alcohol	and	brothels,	murdering	
fortune-tellers	 and	 extorting	money	 from	 entrepreneurs).	 Fur-
thermore,	militants’	success	in	imposing	the	 ‘jihad	tax’	on	busi-
nessmen	has	encouraged	criminal	groups	and	representatives	of	
law	enforcement	 agencies	 to	 act	 in	a	 similar	way	 (forcing	 them	
to	 accept	paid	protection	against	 the	militants	 or	pretending	 to	
be	them).	Therefore,	it	is	often	difficult	to	state	beyond	any	doubt	
whether	a	given	action	has	really	been	carried	out	by	the	rebels.	
In	addition	to	this,	a	new	custom	has	been	observed	in	Dagestan:	
individual	politicians	hire	or	form	their	own	militant	squads	to	
3	 For	more	on	these	issues	see:	Wojciech	Górecki,	‘No	change	in	the	Russian	
Caucasus.	The	winter	Olympics	amid	a	local	war’,	OSW Studies,	2013;	http://
www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-studies/2014-01-27/no-change-rus-
sian-caucasus-winter-olympics-amid-a-local-war
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help	them	fight	against	their	political	and	business	competitors.	
Militants	also	stage	‘contract’	attacks4.
The	 military	 underground’s	 potential	 is	 lessening,	 evidence	 of	
which	includes	the	fact	that	no	major	terrorist	attacks	have	been	
launched	over	the	past	few	years	(one	exception	being	the	attacks	
in	Volgograd,	which	were	probably	 staged	not	upon	 instruction	
from	the	leaders	of	the	Caucasus	Emirate	but	by	a	local	group	from	
Buynaksk	in	Dagestan),	the	inability	to	fulfil	the	threats	that	the	
Sochi	Olympics	would	be	prevented	issued	by	the	previous	leader	
of	the	Caucasus	Emirate,	Dokka	Umarov	(2006–2013),	and	the	fact	
that	most	of	the	clashes	are	not	initiated	by	the	militants	but	by	
Russian	law	enforcement	agencies	who	decimate	them	as	part	of	
special	operations.	
Another	proof	of	partial	stabilisation	in	the	Caucasus	is	from	the	
statistics	showing	the	death	toll	of	the	conflict.	The	most	reliable	
and	complete	statistics	are	provided	by	the	Russian	portal	Cauca-
sian Knot which	specialises	in	Caucasian	issues	and	is	supervised	
by	 the	Memorial	 organisation.	As	 regards	 the	 death	 count	 (Ta-
ble	no.	1),	a	downward	trend	has	been	observed	since	2011,	when	
a	total	of	750	people	were	killed	as	a	consequence	of	military	activ-
ity,	attacks,	murders	committed	by	law	enforcement	agencies,	etc.	
Three	years	later,	the	death	toll	was	around	30%	lower.	If	the	ten-
dency	seen	since	the	beginning	of	this	year	continues	(and	it	will	
be	so	by	all	appearances)	the	death	toll	this	year	will	be	half	the	
number	in	2013.	It	also	needs	to	be	emphasised	that	the	methodol-
ogy	used	by	Caucasian Knot is	quite	schematic,	and	thus	the	death	
toll	of	the	military	conflict	is	overestimated.	The	portal	includes	
in	the	statistics	all	deaths	resulting	from	shooting,	attacks,	etc.,	
without	discriminating	whether	these	came	from	conflicts	with	
Islamic	rebels	or,	for	example,	mafia,	clan	or	family	feuds.
4	 In	contrast	to	Chechnya,	Dagestanian	policy	is	characterised	by	pluralism,	
which	is	inherent	in	the	brutal	rivalry	between	individual	politicians	and	
ethnic	and	criminal	clans.	
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Table 1.	The	death	toll	of	the	conflict	in	the	North	Caucasus	
(2010-2014)
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 first	half	of		2014
Death	toll 749 750 700 529 181
A	clear	downward	 trend	 (from	225	victims	 in	2010	 to	only	21	 in	
the	fist	half	of	2014)	can	also	be	seen	in	the	statistics	showing	the	
death	toll	among	the	representatives	of	the	law	enforcement	agen-
cies	and	–	what	is	especially	important	when	evaluating	the	sta-
bility	of	 the	situation	–	civilians.	As	many	as	349	civilians	were	
killed	 in	 2010,	 yet	 only	 19	 in	 the	first	 half	 of	 2014.	 The	number	
of	militants	killed	has	 remained	at	more	or	 less	 the	 same	 level,	
which	 is	evidence	of	 the	success	of	antiterrorist	operations,	 the	
severity	of	the	law	enforcement	agencies,	who	take	no	prisoners,	
and	the	militants’	weakness	and	lack	of	experience.	
Table 2.	Death	toll	broken	down	by	categories
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 first	half	of		2014
Law	enforce-
ment	agencies
225 190 209 127 21
Militants 349 384 404 298 141
Civilians	 175 176 87 104 19
As	regards	the	situation	in	each	of	the	Northern	Caucasian	repub-
lics,	Dagestan	is	the	unquestionable	leader	in	instability	rankings	
(378	victims	in	2010	and	341	in	2013).	However,	it	should	be	noted	
that	this	is	the	most	populous	of	the	Northern	Caucasian	repub-
lics,	with	a	population	of	around	three	million	(for	comparison,	
around	one	million	people	 live	 in	Chechnya,	around	400,000	in	
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Ingushetia	and	around	850,000	in	Kabardino-Balkaria).	Further-
more,	a	significant	proportion	of	the	victims	in	the	traditionally	
restless	Dagestan	(attacks,	political	murders,	criminal	feuds,	etc.	
have	 been	 commonplace	 there	 since	 the	 early	 1990s)	 were	 not	
killed	 in	battles	between	 the	 law	enforcement	 agencies	 and	 the	
militants.	In	turn,	the	most	noticeable	stabilisation	has	been	seen	
in	Chechnya	(the	death	toll	fell	from	127	in	2010	to	39	in	2013)	and	
in	Ingushetia	(from	134	to	36	within	the	same	timeframe).	
Table 3.	Death	toll	by	republics
Year 2010 2013 first	half	of	2014
Dagestan	 378 341 120
Chechnya 127 39 9
Ingushetia 134 36 12
Northern	Ossetia 24 3 0
Kabardino-Balkaria 79 92 25
Karachay-Cherkessia 2 5 0
Stavropol	Krai 10 13 18
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II. The globalIsaTIoN of CauCasIaN jIhad
One	of	the	reasons	for	the	stabilisation	observed	in	the	Caucasus	
is	the	ideological,	identity	and	organisational	crisis	in	the	mili-
tary	underground	who	have	branded	 themselves	as	 the	Cauca-
sus	Emirate	(see	the	frame	below),	the	establishment	of	which	is	
the	main	goal	of	the	militants’	struggle.	In	ideological	terms,	the	
Caucasus	Emirate,	which	evolved	during	the	Chechen	Wars	from	
Chechen	separatism5	over	the	past	few	years	has	in	fact	been	sub-
sumed	into	global	jihad.	Even	a	quick	look	at	the	numerous	Cau-
casian	Islamic	radicals’	portals,	the	discussions	within	these	cir-
cles	or	recordings	and	statements	of	both	militant	commanders	
and	leaders	of	the	local	Islamic	fundamentalists	reveals	not	only	
their	enormous	interest	in	the	developments	across	the	entire	Is-
lamic	world	but	even	their	 identification	with	 the	global	umma	
and	 jihad	being	fought	 in	different	parts	of	 the	globe	(above	all	
in	 the	Middle	East)6.	While	previously	 ‘Caucasianness’	was	 the	
most	important	notion	for	the	military	underground	in	the	Cau-
casus	 (with	 strong	 solidarity	with	 the	 Islamic	world),	 the	most	
essential	element	of	its	present	ideology	is	‘Islamicness’.	They	are	
thus	fighting	not	so	much	and	not	only	for	the	establishment	of	
an	Islamic	state	in	the	Caucasus,	but	rather	for	the	global	victory	
of	jihad,	whose	aim	is	to	establish	a	caliphate	in	the	lands	inhab-
ited	by	Muslims.	Consequently,	the	term	‘Islamic	mujahideen	in	
the	Caucasus’	characterises	them	more	accurately	than	the	term	
‘Caucasian	 Islamic	militants’.	 Thus	 in	 ideological	 terms	 (albeit	
not	 in	 operational	 ones),	 the	 Caucasus	 Emirate	 has	 undergone	
5	 For	more	 on	 the	 process	 of	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	militants’	 ideology	 from	
Chechen	separatism	to	Caucasian	jihad	see:	Maciej	Falkowski,	 ‘Chechnya:	
between	a	Caucasian	jihad	and	‘hidden’	separatism’,	OSW Point of View,	2007;	
http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/policy-briefs/2007-01-15/chechnya-
between-a-caucasian-jihad-and-hidden-separatism
6	 One	example	could	be	the	heated	discussions	among	Muslim	radicals	and	
inside	Caucasus	Emirate	on	whether	it	is	reasonable	to	go	on	jihad	in	Syria	
and	which	of	the	jihadist	groupings	should	be	supported.	A	similar	discus-
sion	was	seen	after	the	proclamation	of	the	caliphate	by	the	Islamic	State	of	
Iraq	and	the	Levant	(ISIS)	in	July	2014.
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a	transformation	from	a	local	military	organisation	to	a	branch	
of	the	global	jihadist	movement.
Caucasus emirate
The	Caucasus	Emirate	 (in	 the	militants’	 terminology,	 Imarat 
Kavkaz)	was	proclaimed	in	2007	by	the	then	‘president’	of	the	
Chechen	 Republic	 of	 Ichkeria	 (ChRI),	 Dokka	 Umarov,	 later	
known	 as	 the	 ‘emir	 of	 the	 Caucasus’.	 The	 presidents	 of	 the	
ChRI	before	him	were:	Dzhokhar	Dudayev	(1991–1996),	Zelim-
khan	Yandarbiyev	(1996–1997),	Aslan	Maskhadov	(1997–2004)	
and	Abdul	Halim	Sadulayev	(2004–2006).	The	setting	up	of	the	
Caucasus	Emirate	–	which	meant	liquidation	of	the	ChRI	–	was	
a	logical	consequence	of	the	process	of	ideological	evolution	of	
the	military	underground	in	Chechnya:	from	Chechen	separa-
tism	to	pan-Caucasian	jihad.	
According	to	 the	militants’	propaganda,	 the	emirate	 is	an	 Is-
lamic	 state	 extending	 over	 the	 entire	North	Caucasus	 and	 it	
is	 occupied	 by	 Russia.	 It	 is	 divided	 into	 vilayats (provinces):	
Dagestan,	Chechnya,	Ingushetia,	Kabarda-Balkaria-Karachay,	
Circassia	and	the	Nogai	Steppe.	In	reality,	it	is	a	virtual	super-
structure	which	ideologically	unites	the	Islamic	military	un-
derground	operating	in	the	Caucasus.	Although	it	aspires	to	be	
an	underground	state	(which	the	ChRI	was	to	a	certain	extent),	
with	 its	 own	administration,	 courts,	 tax	 collection,	 etc.,	 it	 is	
an	 inept	 imitation	 (the	administration	 is	 formed	by	military	
unit	commanders,	the	‘jurisdiction’	of	the	underground	Sharia	
courts	is	limited	to	the	militants	themselves	and	is	disregarded	
by	the	general	public,	and	the	collection	of	 ‘jihad	taxes’	boils	
down	to	extorting	money	from	entrepreneurs.)	It	is	even	dif-
ficult	 to	classify	 the	emirate	as	a	 terrorist	organisation	sensu 
stricto,	 since	 it	 is	 a	network.	The	 local	 armed	groups	 formed	
by	between	more	than	ten	and	several	dozen	militants,	oper-
ating	under	the	label	of	the	emirate	and	formally	recognising	
the	 emir	 as	 their	 leader	 (since	March	 2014,	 he	 is	 Aliaskhab	
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Kebekov	alias	Ali	Abu	Muhammad),	contact	each	other	on	very	
rare	occasions,	if	at	all,	and	are	engaged	in	uncoordinated	and	
dispersed	activities.	A	small	section	of	the	militants	form	guer-
rilla	troops	which	have	bases	in	the	mountains,	while	most	of	
them	live	 in	the	cities	or	villages,	and	from	time	to	time	 join	
military	actions,	attacks,	etc.	In	total,	probably	not	more	than	
1,000	militants	are	active	(take	part	in	operations)	in	the	Cau-
casus	as	a	whole,	most	of	them	in	Dagestan.
Paradoxically,	 the	 evolution	 of	Caucasus	Emirate’s	 ideology	 and	
identity	 has	 resulted	 in	 the	 weakening	 of	 the	 military	 under-
ground	in	the	Caucasus.	The	 ideological	dilution	of	 the	military	
struggle	in	global	jihad	has	deprived	it	of	its	uniqueness	and	mar-
ginalised	it,	considering	the	priority	given	to	the	Syrian	and	Iraqi	
fronts.	The	peripheral	nature	of	Caucasian	jihad	coupled	with	the	
lack	of	military	successes	and	chances	of	success	has	made	it	less	
appealing	not	only	to	potential	volunteers	from	the	Islamic	world	
(none	of	them	are	present	in	the	Caucasus	now),	but	also	to	local	
recruits	and	even	active	militants.	In	effect,	the	number	of	volun-
teers	wishing	to	join	guerrilla	troops	in	the	Caucasus	(mainly	in	
Chechnya)	has	reduced	significantly,	and	their	influx	has	been	re-
directed	to	the	Middle	East,	above	all	to	Syria	(in	the	case	of	many	
of	them,	their	departure	was	preceded	by	being	a	refugee	in	Eu-
rope).	Furthermore,	active	fighters,	including	some	commanders	
(e.g.	Tarkhan	Gaziyev)	have	started	leaving	the	Caucasus	for	Syr-
ia.	Dagestanians	and	Chechens	predominate	among	those	leaving	
for	the	Middle	East.	
The	fact	that	Caucasian	radicals	have	physically	joined	the	global	
jihad	sets	a	precedent	in	the	history	of	modern	Caucasian	wars.	
Never	before	have	they	participated	on	a	mass	scale	in	jihad	out-
side	the	Caucasus	(except	 for	some	individual	cases	 in	Afghani-
stan).	 The	most	widely	 publicised	 and	 the	most	 spectacular	 ac-
tions	held	by	Caucasian	militants	have	been	recently	seen	not	in	
Grozny	or	the	mountains	of	Dagestan,	but	near	Aleppo	and	Kob-
ane	 in	 Syria	 or	Mosul	 in	 Iraq,	 where	 several	 armed	 groupings	
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formed	by	Caucasian	émigrés	 are	active.	The	peripheral	nature	
of	the	Caucasian	front	and	the	priority	granted	to	Syria	and	Iraq	
also	mean	that	the	Caucasus	Emirate	may	not	count	on	financial	
support	from	the	circles	which	back	jihad	in	the	Muslim	world.
Caucasian militants in the Middle east
It	is	estimated	that	between	1,000	and	3,000	militants	of	Cau-
casian	origin	(the	North	Caucasus,	Azerbaijan	and	the	Pank-
isi	Gorge	in	Georgia)	may	be	active	in	Syria	and	–	to	a	lesser	
extent	–	in	Iraq.	Most	of	them	are	Dagestanis	and	Chechens.	
Initially,	those	who	joined	jihadist	troops	in	Syria	were	Cauca-
sian	students	attending	Islamic	schools	in	the	Middle	East	and	
Chechen	refugees	living	in	Turkey.	Another	wave	was	formed	
by	 Chechen	 refugees	 living	 in	 Europe	 (according	 to	 various	
estimates,	between	150,000	and	250,000	Chechens	live	in	EU	
member	 states)	 –	 both	 experienced	 militants	 and	 new	 re-
cruits.	The	influx	of	 ‘European’	volunteers	has	been	reduced	
over	the	past	few	months	since	they	now	find	it	more	difficult	
to	leave	Europe	as	a	result	of	closer	co-operation	between	Eu-
ropean	 and	Turkish	 secret	 services.	 In	 turn,	 since	 the	 posi-
tion	of	the	commander,	Omar	al-Shishani	(shishani in	Arabic	
means	 ‘Chechen’),	has	become	stronger	within	 Islamic	State	
structures	(one	of	the	key	commanders	and	aides	of	the	self-
proclaimed	Caliph	 Ibrahim	alias	Abu-Bakr	al-Baghdadi),	 the	
number	of	recruits	arriving	in	Syria	directly	from	the	Cauca-
sus	via	Turkey	has	increased	(logistically,	this	is	not	a	problem,	
given	the	existence	of	a	visa-free	regime	between	Russia	and	
Turkey	 and	 numerous	 direct	 airline	 connections,	 including	
Grozny–Istanbul,	Mineralnye	Vody–Istanbul,	Makhachkala–	
–Istanbul,	etc.).
A	phenomenon	that	would	require	a	separate	discussion	is	the	
mass	influx	to	Syria	of	ethnic	Chechens	living	in	the	Pankisi	
Gorge	in	Georgia	(only	several	thousand	Chechens	live	there).	
It	 is	 estimated	 that	 as	many	as	 200	of	 them	have	 arrived	 in	
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Syria.	The	numerous	participation	of	 representatives	of	 this	
small	 community	 in	 the	 jihad	probably	 stems	 from	changes	
in	conceptions	of	 identity,	above	all	 Islamisation	of	 the	 local	
youth	under	the	influence	of	refugees	from	Chechnya	and	mil-
itants	who	were	hiding	in	the	gorge	during	the	Second	Chech-
en	War,	as	well	as	vast	unemployment	and	frustration	among	
young	people	there.
The	most	important	elements	of	Caucasian	mujahideen	fight-
ing	in	the	Middle	East	are:	
•	 the	 groupings	which	 report	 to	 Islamic	 State	 (former	 ISIS)	
and	 are	 led	 by	 an	 ethnic	 Chechen	 from	 Georgia,	 Omar	
al-Shishani	(born	Tarkhan	Batirashvili;).	and	a	commander	
known	by	his	nom	de	guerre	Abu	Jihad	al-Shishani	(an	eth-
nic	Karachay,	his	real	name	is	not	known);	
•	 a	group	led	by	Salahuddin	al-Shishani	(his	real	name	is	un-
known)	which	formally	reports	to	Caucasus	Emirate	and	is	
in	conflict	with	the	Omar	al-Shishani’s	group;	until	recent-
ly,	the	group	was	named	Army	of	Emigrants	and	Support-
ers	( Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar);	at	present,	after	having	
teamed	up	with	the	mujahideen	from	other	countries,	it	is	
known	as	Jamaat Ahadun Ahad);
•	 an	 independent	group	named	Lions	of	Syria	 ( Jundu Sham)	
led	by	Muslim	Valid	al-Shishani	(Murad	Margoshvili)	who	
originates	from	Pankisi	and	who	fought	in	Chechnya	along-
side	Shamil	Basayev	and	Khattab;	
•	 the	group	of	Tarkhan	Gaziyev	–	until	recently,	one	of	the	key	
Chechen	gureilla	commanders	–	which	is	allied	to	the	latter	two.
In	addition	to	those	mentioned	above,	a	few	more	smaller	in-
dependent	groups	led	by	Chechens	are	engaged	in	the	fighting	
in	Syria,	mainly	near	Aleppo.
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The	 ‘globalisation’	of	Caucasian	 jihad	has	alienated	 the	military	
underground	 from	 the	 local	 Caucasian	 communities.	 Although	
these	 communities	 identify	with	 the	Muslim	world,	 their	 local	
Caucasian	and	Chechen,	Ingush,	Avar,	etc.	identity	is	still	much	
more	 important	 to	 them.	 Even	 though	 Salafi	 ideas	 are	 gaining	
popularity	 among	 young	 people	 in	 the	 Caucasus	 (Salafism	 has	
even	become	the	dominant	ideology	in	Dagestan),	most	residents	
of	the	region	still	perceive	themselves	as	Chechen/Dagestanian/
Ingush	etc.	Muslims,	and	not	–	unlike	the	militants	–	as	Muslims	
from	 the	 Caucasus.	 Furthermore,	 the	 Caucasian	 communities	
(with	the	exception	of	Salafis,	who	account	for	just	a	few	percent	
of	the	population)	do	not	accept	the	religious	radicalism	of	the	mu-
jahideen,	and	above	all,	their	sharp	criticism	of	Sufism,	which	is	
deeply	rooted	in	Dagestan,	Chechnya	and	Ingushetia,	and	which	
from	the	Salafi	point	of	view	is	heresy.	This	has	a	special	meaning	
in	Chechnya,	where	Sufism	(mainly	the	Qadiriyya	brotherhood)	
is	one	of	 the	key	elements	of	 the	Chechen	national	 identity	and	
where	 Islamisation	 of	 the	 socio-political	 life	 is	 not	 only	 rapidly	
developing	 but	 is	 also	 supported	 and	 sometimes	 even	 imposed	
by	 the	 government	 of	 the	 republic.	 Thus,	 the	 fundamentalists’	
propaganda	 is	not	convincing	to	most	of	 the	residents	of	 this	de 
facto	Islamic,	semi-independent	Chechen	republic.	The	activity	of	
informants,	which	has	become	commonplace	as	a	consequence	of	
anti-terrorist	operations,	is	also	having	its	impact	(militants	may	
not	 count	 on	 support	 from	 the	 general	 public,	 apart	 from	 their	
relatives,	 residents	of	 their	villages	 and	people	who	 share	 their	
views,	unlike	the	Chechen	fighters	during	the	First	Chechen	War).	
Jihad	has	also	lost	momentum	in	the	Caucasus	alienated	because	
the	peaceful	trend	within	Caucasian,	and	in	particular	Dagestan-
ian,	Salafism	has	gained	strength.	The	 increasing	popularity	of	
Salafi	ideas	among	young	people	thus	does	not	necessarily	trans-
late	into	their	support	for	jihad.	Partly	this	is	a	consequence	of	the	
temporary	loosening	of	the	repression	against	peaceful	Salafis	in	
2011–2013.	This	happened	in	connection	with	the	dialogue	initiated	
by	the	previous	leader	of	Dagestan,	Magomedsalam	Magomedov,	
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between	Salafis	(organised	into	the	Association	of	Scholars	Ahlu	
Sunna)	 and	 Sufi	 Islam	 (represented	 by	 the	 Spiritual	 Board	 of	
Muslims	of	Dagestan).	Since	it	has	become	possible	for	Salafis	to	
practice	their	faith	(the	operation	of	Salafi	mosques,	persecution	
for	wearing	‘Salafi’	beards,	etc.	has	stopped),	some	of	them	could	
have	refrained	from	joining	the	militants.	Another	sign	that	the	
moderate	trend	has	gained	strength	among	Dagestanian	Salafis	is	
the	fact	that	the	grouping	Hizb	ut-Tahrir	has	become	visible.	This	
grouping	has	been	almost	absent	from	the	North	Caucasus	until	
recently,	while	it	has	for	years	been	very	active,	for	example,	in	
Central	Asia	and	among	Russian	Muslims	(mainly	in	the	Volga	Re-
gion).	Although	it	has	been	recognised	as	a	terrorist	organisation	
in	Russia,	 its	aim	is	 to	rebuild	the	Islamic	caliphate	by	peaceful	
means	(and	this	organisation	has	genuinely	stuck	to	this	principle	
in	the	post-Soviet	area).
salafism and sufism in the North Caucasus
salafism –	 an	 Islamic	 religious	movement	 of	 global	 nature.	
It	 focuses	on	 the	need	 for	 religious	and	moral	 revival	 in	 the	
spirit	of	‘pure’	Islam,	i.e.	based	solely	and	uncompromisingly	
on	the	Quran	and	the	classical	tradition	(sunnah	and	hadith).	
It	is	a	grassroots	movement	–	it	needs	no	organisation	struc-
tures	and	has	no	uniform,	consistent	and	binding	socio-polit-
ical	agenda.	However,	Salafis	are	allowed	to	become	engaged	
in	various	political	and	social	activities,	both	legal	and,	for	ex-
ample,	terrorist.	
In	 the	post-Soviet	area,	Salafism	is	 frequently	–	and	errone-
ously	–	identified	with	Wahhabism,	which	is	understood	not	
as	the	historic	school	of	Quranic	law	and	the	political	move-
ment	which	had	laid	the	foundations	for	modern	Saudi	Arabia,	
but	as	armed	and	 terrorist	movements	drawing	upon	 Islam,	
mainly	in	the	Northern	Caucasus	(it	is	de facto	a	synonym	of	
terrorism).
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  1
1/
20
14
20
In	the	Caucasian	context,	Salafis	can	be	divided	into	moderate	
and	radical;	the	measure	for	this	being	their	attitude	to	armed	
struggle.	 The	moderate	 peaceful	 Salafis	 do	 not	 take	 part	 in	
the	jihad,	believing	that	–	given	the	circumstances	–	its	is	not	
part	of	their	religious	obligations.	In	turn,	the	radical	warring	
Salafis,	want	to	fulfil	their	fundamentalist	demands	through	
armed	 struggle	 and	 the	 use	 of	 violence	 (the	 need	 for	 jihad).	
Thus	the	term	‘warring	Salafis’	can	be	used	with	regard	to	the	
militants	fighting	under	the	banner	of	the	Caucasus	Emirate.	
sufism	–	a	mystical	 trend	within	Islam,	which	is	externally	
manifested	through	the	operation	of	Sufi	brotherhoods.	This	
trend	is	deeply	rooted	in	the	Caucasus,	and	is	viewed	there	as	
‘traditional’	 Islam	 as	 opposed	 to	 ‘non-traditional’	 Salafism.	
In	 the	 19th	 century,	Sufism	was	 the	driving	 force	 for	 Islamic	
revival	 in	 the	 region,	 for	 ‘purifying’	 Islam	 of	 non-canonical	
Iocal	influences	and	the	ideological	base	for	Caucasian	insur-
gents	fighting	against	Russia	(Imam	Shamil	was	a	member	of	
the	Naqshbandiya	brotherhood).	Islam	survived	in	the	Cauca-
sus	in	the	Soviet	times	mainly	owing	to	the	operation	of	un-
derground	Sufi	brotherhoods.	When	the	USSR	collapsed,	the	
brotherhoods	loyal	to	the	state	and	supported	by	the	govern-
ments,	which	were	 combating	 Salafis,	 gained	 power	 and	 in	
fact	took	control	of	official	 Islam	in	Dagestan,	Chechnya	and	
Ingushetia	 (the	 spiritual	 boards	 of	Muslims,	muftiyats).	 Be-
ing	 the	government’s	 close	 ally	 and	a	 serious	political	 force,	
Sufism	is	fiercely	combating	Salafis,	who	in	turn	see	Sufis	as	
heretics	who,	for	example,	through	their	cult	of	Sufi	leaders,	
sheikhs,	 violate	 the	main	 pillar	 of	 Islam	 –	monotheism	 (the	
unity	and	indivisibility	of	God).
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III. The CrIsIs IN CauCasus eMIraTe
The	problems	resulting	from	the	evolution	of	ideology	and	iden-
tity	seen	over	 the	past	 few	years	 in	 the	military	 Islamic	under-
ground	 in	 the	Caucasus	are	closely	 linked	 to	 the	organisational	
crisis	which	 the	 Caucasus	 Emirate	 has	 recently	 found	 itself	 in.	
Manifestations	of	this	include	the	increasingly	less	frequent	and	
effective	military	and	terrorist	actions,	which	have	been	limited	
to	small	local	operations,	the	bulk	of	which	have	been	plotted	in	
Dagestan.	 In	 Chechnya,	which	 until	 recently	was	 the	 centre	 of	
Caucasian	 jihad,	 guerrilla	 warfare	 brings	 to	 mind	 the	 activity	
of	 the	abreks, the	 legendary	 solitary	warriors,	who	were	hiding	
in	the	mountains	long	after	the	capitulation	of	Imam	Shamil	and	
the	end	of	the	19th-century	Caucasian	War.	In	the	other	republics,	
these	 guerillas	 are	 amateurs	 acting	 locally	 or	 desperados	 seek-
ing	personal	revenge,	whose	acts	are	often	difficult	to	distinguish	
from	criminal	activity7.
The	main	 reason	 behind	 the	 organisational	 crisis	 is	 the	 conse-
quences	 of	 the	 long-lasting	 and	 devastating	 military	 conflict	
(it	has	continued	unbroken	since	1999).	This	conflict,	along	with	
the	Chechenisation	policy	(this	topic	will	be	discussed	in	the	next	
chapter),	has	led	to	the	degradation	of	Chechen	guerrillas,	who	had	
for	many	years	been	the	vanguard	of	the	military	underground	
in	 the	Caucasus,	 building	 their	 strength	on	 the	 experience	 and	
foreign	 contacts	 of	 Chechen	 commanders	 and	 political	 leaders.	
This	weakness	is	also	a	result	of	the	shortage	of	experienced	com-
manders	(the	sort	of	Aslan	Maskhadov,	Shamil	Basayev	or	Ruslan	
Gelayev)	and	rank	and	file	militants,	who	have	died,	emigrated	to	
7	 Revenge	for	the	death	of	loved	ones	or	own	humiliation	(for	example,	while	
being	arrested)	is	among	the	main	motives	for	joining	the	guerrilla	forces	
among	 the	 members	 of	 the	 Islamic	 underground	 in	 the	 Caucasus	 today.	
Even	in	the	case	of	the	present	leader	of	the	emirate,	Ali	Abu	Muhammad	
(Aliaskhab	Kebekov),	 personal	 revenge	was	 the	 initial	motivation	 for	his	
joining	the	jihad	(for	the	death	of	his	uncle,	the	well-known	Islamic	scholar,	
Murtazali	Magomedov,	who	was	especially	dear	to	Kebekov).
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Syria	or	Europe	or	(in	the	case	of	Chechnya)	have	taken	the	side	
of	Kadyrov.	The	militants	are	also	short	of	new	recruits,	who	have	
been	unable	to	fill	 the	gap	left	by	their	 inexperienced	predeces-
sors	who	were	decimated	 as	part	 of	 special	 operations	 (most	 of	
them	are	killed	on	the	spot	during	antiterrorist	operations).	
A	serious	blow	to	the	Caucasus	Emirate	was	the	death	of	Dokka	
Umarov,	 who	 had	 led	 the	 militants	 from	 2006	 and	 had	 taken	
part	 in	both	Chechen	Wars8.	The	very	 long	 interregnum,	which	
lasted	until	 spring	2014,	may	be	evidence	of	a	 serious	disagree-
ment	among	the	militants	over	who	should	be	his	successor	and	of	
probable	disputes	between	Chechens,	who	were	lobbying	for	the	
well-known	 commander	 Aslambek	 Vadalov,	 and	 the	 militants	
from	 the	 other	 republics.	 Finally,	 Aliaskhab	Kebekov,	 native	 of	
Dagestan,	who	has	no	experience	 in	combat	and	 is	 lacking	cha-
risma,	was	 elected	 as	 the	 new	 emir.	His	 already	weak	 position	
among	both	the	militants	in	the	Caucasus	(one	proof	of	which	is,	
for	example,	the	fact	that	Chechen	guerrillas	led	by	Aslan	Batu-
kaev	are	distancing	themselves	from	the	emir9)	and	the	Chechens	
fighting	in	Syria	has	eroded	further	due	to	Kebekov’s	conciliatory	
views	on	jihad	(in	one	of	his	first	speeches	he	distanced	himself	
from	attacks	on	civilian	targets	and	prohibited	women’s	partici-
pation	in	suicide	attacks).	
The	emir’s	esteem	has	suffered	as	a	consequence	of	his	inept	inter-
ference	in	disputes	between	the	groups	of	Caucasian	militants	in	
the	Middle	East	as	to	which	jihadist	organisation	operating	there	
they	 should	become	allied	with	 (he	 clearly	 supported	 Jabhat	 al-
Nusra,	an	organisation	linked	to	Al-Qaeda,	and	sharply	criticised	
8	 He	died	in	September	2013,	probably	as	a	result	of	poisonning.
9	 The	Chechen	underground,	which	is	part	of	the	Caucasus	Emirate,	as	part	of	
its	separate	information	policy	runs	www.checheninfo.com,	a	website	un-
controlled	by	the	emir.	In	turn,	the	fact	that	the	Chechen	language	is	more	
and	more	often	used	than	Russian	(unlike	before)	proves	that	Chechen	mili-
tants	have	become	focused	on	 their	own	community.	The	Chechen	 leader	
also	has	his	individual	representative	abroad.	
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ISIS	and	the	Chechen	troops	led	by	it	shortly	before	the	proclama-
tion	of	Islamic	State	and	the	caliphate).	Kebekov	and	his	support-
ers	(including	the	people	 linked	to	the	portal	Kavkazcenter.com	
and	the	Caucasian	mujahideen	who	are	fighting	in	Syria	as	part	of	
the	Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar organisation)	have	been	making	
efforts	to	salvage	his	position	by,	for	example,	publishing	record-
ings	 in	which	militants	 from	each	of	 the	 republics	 (vilayats, ac-
cording	to	the	militants’	terminology)	take	their	oath	to	the	emir	
for	 the	 second	 time.	 Furthermore,	 a	 statement	 from	 one	 of	 the	
most	 influential	 spiritual	 leaders	of	 jihad,	 the	 Jordanian	sheikh	
Abu	Muhammad	al-Makdisi,	was	published	 in	 early	August.	 In	
this	recording,	the	sheikh	thanked	Kebekov	for	his	assistance	in	
the	jihad	in	Syria	and	called	upon	Caucasian	fighters	to	show	him	
obedience	(in	fact,	Kebekov,	like	Umarov	before,	was	opposed	to	
the	Caucasian	militants	leaving	to	become	engaged	in	the	jihad	in	
Syria,	being	aware	of	the	fact	that	this	will	weaken	the	military	
struggle	in	the	Caucasus)10.	
10	 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XQPRYqUszg8#t=413
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IV. The effeCTs of CheCheNIsaTIoN  
aNd The ‘CarroT aNd sTICk’ TaCTIC
The	consequences	of	the	Russian	policy	towards	the	region,	above	
all	Chechnya,	constitute	an	equally	important	reason	for	the	par-
tial	 stabilisation	 in	 the	 Caucasus.	 The	 so-called	 Chechenisation	
policy	in	place	since	around	2002	has	called	for	replacing	the	pre-
vious	policy	of	occupation	of	Chechnya	(which	was	implemented	
by	 federal	 law	 enforcement	 agencies),	 relinquishing	 power	 in	
the	republic	to	the	loyal	Kadyrov	clan	(to	Akhmad	Kadyrov	until	
2004,	and	then	to	his	son,	Ramzan),	offering	the	republic	genuine	
internal	 independence,	 guaranteeing	 stable	 financing	 from	 the	
federal	budget	and	entrusting	the	government	in	Grozny	with	re-
sponsibility	for	combating	the	military	underground	in	exchange	
for	stabilisation	of	the	situation	using	any	possible	means11.	Since	
both	 parties	 (President	Vladimir	 Putin	 and	 the	Kadyrovs)	 have	
observed	the	terms	of	 the	unwritten	agreement,	 this	policy	has	
been	consistently	implemented,	resulting	in	genuine	stabilisation	
of	the	situation	in	Chechnya,	which	is	at	present	the	most	peace-
ful	republic	in	the	North	Caucasus	(without	considering	the	tra-
ditionally	 peaceful	 Northern	 Ossetia,	 Karachay-Cherkessia	 and	
Adygea).	The	stabilisation	in	Chechnya	became	possible	owing	to	
the	policy	adopted	by	the	Kadyrovs	–	a	skilful	combination	of	the	
use	of	force	(bloody	terror	with	regard	to	militants	who	refused	
to	lay	down	arms	and	their	families,	and	informant	activity	de-
veloped	on	an	unprecedented	scale),	political	methods	(amnesties	
for	militants	and	their	inclusion	in	the	troops	being	formed	under	
the	government’s	auspices,	neutralisation	or	physical	liquidation	
of	opponents	from	other	clans,	and	creation	of	a	dictatorship)	and	
ideology	(drawing	upon	Chechen	nationalism	and	Sufi	Islam,	and	
contesting	Salafi	 ideas).	Although	by	establishing	a	dictatorship	
in	Chechnya	Kadyrov	broke	the	egalitarianism,	which	was	very	
11	 For	more	on	 the	Chechenisation	policy	see:	Maciej	Falkowski,	 ‘Chechnya:	
between	a	Caucasian	jihad	and	‘hidden’	separatism’,	OSW Point of View,	2007;	
http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/policy-briefs/2007-01-15/chechnya-
between-a-caucasian-jihad-and-hidden-separatism
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strong	 in	 Chechen	 society,	 and	 violated	 the	 centuries-long	 tra-
dition	where	the	exercise	of	power	must	be	based	on	a	compro-
mise	between	the	teyps	(families)	and	the	virds (branches	of	Sufi	
brotherhoods12),	Chechen	society,	exhausted	by	the	long	war	and	
additionally	deprived	of	their	most	active	members,	who	had	emi-
grated,	were	ready	to	accept	Kadyrov’s	dictatorship.	
The	price	Moscow	is	paying	for	the	stabilisation	is	high.	A	quasi-
independent	state	is	being	formed	in	Chechnya	under	Kadyrov’s	
rule,	and	contacts	between	Moscow	and	Grozny	resemble	that	of	
a	confederation	model.	Chechnya	is	gaining	more	and	more	auton-
omy	every	year:	the	republic	is	governed	by	its	own	rules	(a	mix	of	
Sharia	law,	adats,	i.e.	Chechen	customary	laws,	and	the	principle	
of	 ‘might	 is	 right’;	Russian	 legislation	 is	 in	use	only	 to	a	 limited	
extent),	 is	 forming	 in	 fact	 its	own	armed	forces	 (the	 formations	
which	report	 to	Kadyrov	are	only	 formally	affiliated	 to	 the	 fed-
eral	structures),	and	maintains	limited	foreign	contacts	(mainly	
economic;	Kadyrov	has	his	unofficial	representatives	in	selected	
countries,	such	as	Ukraine,	Turkey	and	France;	developing	con-
tacts	with	Islamic	countries).	In	civilisational	terms,	Chechnya	is	
so	strongly	de-Russified	and	Islamised	that	it	is	difficult	to	see	it	as	
part	of	the	Russian	Federation.	However,	Moscow	is	ready	to	pay	
this	high	price,	being	aware	of	the	fact	that	the	only	alternative	is	
the	return	to	the	situation	seen	in	the	1990s	and	destabilisation	of	
the	republic.	
The	situation	has	become	calmer	in	the	other	republics	as	a	con-
sequence	of	two	paradoxically	mutually	excluding	factors.	On	the	
one	hand,	one	can	feel	the	long-term	consequences	of	the	policy	of	
easing	the	repression	used	against	peaceful	Salafis	(the	Sufi-Salafi	
dialogue	 in	Dagestan)	and	 the	militants	who	had	decided	 to	 lay	
12	 Kadyrov	has	used	as	 the	religious	base	 the	strongest	Chechen	Sufi	broth-
erhood,	the	Kunta-haji	brotherhood,	whose	founder,	Kunta-haji	Kishiev,	as	
opposed	to	Imam	Shamil,	propagated	in	the	second	half	of	the	19th	century	
the	need	to	end	the	war	and	reach	a	compromise	with	Russians	for	the	sake	
of	the	Chechen	nation’s	physical	survival.
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down	arms	(the	promising	results	of	the	efforts	for	rehabilitation	
of	former	militants	made	by	the	president	of	Ingushetia,	Yunus-
bek	Yevkurov)	implemented	in	2011–2013.	On	the	other	hand,	these	
are	 the	 outcomes	 of	 the	 brutal	 pacifications	 carried	 out	 in	 late	
2013/early	2014	as	part	of	the	preparations	for	the	Sochi	Olympics.	
Russian	law	enforcement	agencies	physically	liquidated	dozens	of	
militants	and	their	supporters	across	the	Caucasus	as	part	of	spe-
cial	operations	and	(in	the	case	of	Chechnya)	air	forces	launched	
massive	bombardments	of	the	militants’	hiding	places.	The	anti-
terrorist	operation	in	Chechnya	has	been	successful	mainly	due	
to	 the	 fact	 that,	 as	 part	 of	 the	 Chechenisation	 policy,	 the	main	
responsibility	 for	 combating	 the	 guerrillas	 has	 been	 placed	 on	
Kadyrov’s	troops	(de facto formed	by	former	militants),	which	are	
much	more	effective	than	the	federal	forces.	Similar	methods	also	
began	to	be	used	on	a	smaller	scale	 in	the	other	republics	 (Dag-
estan	and	Ingushetia),	where,	in	addition	to	all	this,	young	people	
who	have	no	combat	experience	predominate	among	the	militants	
(hence	the	huge	losses	among	their	ranks).
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V. The Illusory sTabIlIsaTIoN
Although	the	clashes	in	the	Caucasus	have	become	noticeably	less	
intensive,	peace	in	the	region	is	illusory	and	precarious,	since	it	
has	resulted	from	a	change	 in	the	situation	and	not	 the	system.	
It	is	not	an	end	product	of	a	lasting	solution	to	the	region’s	most	
pressing	political,	social	and	economic	problems,	which	generate	
chronic	instability.	
The	main	problem	Moscow	has	failed	to	resolve	is	the	Caucasus’s	
integration	with	the	rest	of	Russia;	its	civilisational	distinctness	
from	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 country	 is	 constantly	 deepening.	 Further-
more,	the	policy	of	Chechenisation	and	isolation	of	the	Caucasus	
(for	example,	a	 limited	number	of	Caucasian	recruits	have	been	
called	up	to	the	Russian	army	between	2001	and	2014;	emigrants	
for	this	region	are	discriminated	against	as	regards	employment	
in	 the	 state	 administration;	 the	 Caucasus	was	 granted	 the	 sta-
tus	of	a	separate	federal	district	in	2010)	proves	that	the	federal	
government’s	 attempts	 at	 counteracting	 de-Russification	 have	
not	only	been	unsuccessful	but	they	have	also	in	fact	contributed	
to	this	process.	The	slogan	‘stop	feeding	the	Caucasus’	is	gaining	
popularity,	and	what	used	to	be	a	marginal	idea,	namely	separat-
ing	the	Caucasus	from	Russia,	is	being	propagated	by	increasingly	
wider	political	circles	(including	above	all	Russian	nationalists)13.	
The	Caucasus’s	stability	 is	closely	 linked	 to	 the	stability	of	Rus-
sia	 itself.	A	 serious	 economic	 and/or	 political	 crisis	 in	 the	Rus-
sian	 Federation,	 which	 cannot	 be	 ruled	 out	 in	 the	 immediate	
future,	 will	 be	 equivalent	 to	 an	 ‘unfreezing’	 of	 the	 Caucasian	
problems,	which	may	 explode	with	 new	 strength	 (as	 happened	
in	1917	or	1991).	Another	factor	which	adds	to	the	risk	of	a	serious	
13	 For	more	 see:	Maciej	 Falkowski,	 ‘The	 ‘Tribal	Areas’	 of	 the	Caucasus.	 The	
North	Caucasus	–	an	enclave	of	‘alien	civilisation’	within	the	Russian	Fed-
eration’, OSW Point of View,	 2010;	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/
osw-studies/2010-04-14/tribal-areas-caucasus-north-caucasus-enclave-
alien-civilisation;	Wojciech	Górecki,	op. cit.
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destabilisation	in	the	Caucasus	is	the	tradition	of	using	this	region	
as	a	useful	instrument	in	Russian	political	games.	The	present	sta-
bility	may	also	be	disturbed,	if	subsidies	from	the	federal	budget	
to	the	Caucasian	republics,	which	now	account	for	80-90%	of	the	
local	budgets,	are	decreased.	Concerns	that	the	situation	could	de-
velop	this	way	have	been	expressed	during	the	discussion	on	the	
costs	of	the	annexation	of	Crimea	by	Russia	and	the	consequences	
of	the	Western	and	Russian	sanctions	imposed	in	connection	with	
the	Ukrainian	 crisis.	 These	 concerns	 are	 not	 groundless,	 given	
the	fact	that	the	Accounts	Chamber	of	the	Russian	Federation	has	
confirmed	 that	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 decrease	 the	 subsidies	 for	 the	
North	Caucasus14.
The	 ‘unfreezing’	 of	 the	 Caucasian	 problems,	 especially	 if	 this	
comes	from	the	Kremlin	loosening	its	grip	on	the	region	as	a	con-
sequence	of	an	internal	crisis,	may	lead	above	all	 to	a	rejuvena-
tion	 of	 the	 idea	 of	 Chechen	 independence.	 Ramzan	 Kadyrov	 is	
laying	the	foundations	for	this	idea	much	more	successfully	than	
General	Dzhokhar	Dudayev	did	in	the	early	1990s.	The	Caucasus	
Emirate	 idea	may	also	gain	new	energy	 in	 a	 situation	 like	 this,	
since	the	struggle	to	build	a	single	Islamic	state	is	deeply	rooted	
in	the	Caucasus	and	may	attract	many	more	supporters	than	cur-
rently,	when	chaos	comes	and	the	state	structures	are	weakened	
(as	with	the	Islamic	fundamentalists	who	have	widely	employed	
the	slogans	of	social	justice	in	such	countries	as	Iraq,	Afghanistan	
and	Somalia).
The	situation	in	the	Caucasus	has	more	and	more	in	common	with	
the	developments	in	the	Middle	East,	which	is	a	novelty.	The	pre-
sent	situation	in	the	Middle	East	(deepening	chaos)	contributes	to	
stabilisation	in	the	Caucasus	and	is	favourable	from	the	Russian	
government’s	point	of	view	(local	recruits	and	émigré	Chechens	
are	heading	to	Syria	and	Iraq	instead	of	the	Caucasus).	However,	
14	 http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/245652/.	 The	 Accounts	 Chamber	 of	 the	
Russian	Federation	is	a	parliamentary	body	in	charge	of	financial	supervision.
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the	globalisation	of	 the	Caucasian	 jihad	and	the	participation	of	
numerous	Caucasian	militants	 in	 the	battles	 in	 the	Middle	East	
may	become	a	problem	for	Russia	in	the	longer	run.	Although	it	
does	not	seem	probable	at	the	moment,	if	the	geopolitical	condi-
tions	become	favourable	to	the	Caucasian	mujahideen	(Russia	los-
ing	its	grip	on	the	Caucasus	alongside	chaos	in	the	region),	they	
may	return	to	the	Caucasus.	Seasoned	in	battle	and	with	exten-
sive	contacts	 in	the	 international	 terrorist	network,	 they	would	
then	become	a	much	more	serious	military	and	political	power.	
Chechnya,	as	governed	by	Kadyrov,	is	the	key	element	of	the	pre-
sent	political	puzzle	in	the	Caucasus.	However,	its	stability	is	to	an	
equal	extent	tangible	and	ephemeral,	since	it	is	based	on	unstable	
elements:	the	unwritten	agreement	between	Vladimir	Putin	and	
Ramzan	Kadyrov	and	 the	dictatorship	 imposed	by	 the	 latter	on	
the	Chechen	public	and	clans.	If	the	Kremlin	got	rid	of	Kadyrov	
or	–	which	is	a	more	likely	scenario	in	the	Caucasus	–	the	presi-
dent	was	killed	in	an	attack	(and	the	initiators	of	the	attack	may	
be	driven	by	personal	 rather	 than	political	motives,	 e.g.	 a	 fam-
ily	vendetta),	the	present	political	system,	which	is	not	based	on	
a	consensus	between	the	public	and	the	 local	clans,	would	very	
likely	be	thrown	into	disarray.	This	would	also	give	rise	to	inter-
nal	conflicts	 in	the	republic,	 the	consequences	of	which	are	dif-
ficult	to	predict.	
MaCIej falkowskI
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The North Caucasus
Abberviations:	N.	O.	−	North	Ossetia;	S.	O.	−	South	Ossetia;	ING.	−	Ingushetia	
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The virtual Caucasus Emirate which the militants are fighting 
to establish
source:	www.kavkazcenter.com
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